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PETITION FOR AN AW ARD OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES IN CONNECTION WITH APPEAL 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County, Hon. A. H. Ellett, District Judge. 
RE8PONDENT'S STATEMENT 
OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
As stated by the appellant, this is an action for di-
vorce wherein the plaintiff by her complaint seeks a 
divorce, custody of the minor child of the parties, sup-
port money, alimony and a monetary award. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted the plaintiff the divorce, 
awarded her custody of the minor child of the parties, 
the sum of $200 each month as support money for the 
minor child, the sum of $250 per month until her death or 
remarriage as alimony, and judgment in the sum of 
$15,000 as a division of property and $1,750 as attorney's 
fees. From the decree in favor of the plaintiff the def en-
dant has appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have this court affirm the 
judgment and decree of the trial court, and award her 
an additional attorney's fee in the amount of $i9.t2 .. '.~ 
for legal services rendered by her attorney in connection 
with this appeal. 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 
AND EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Constance H. Barrett is the plaintiff and respondent. 
Robert Michael Barrett is the defendant and appellant. 
For practical purposes Constance H. Barrett is some-
times ref erred to by her own name or as the plaintiff and 
Robert Michael Barrett is sometimes referred to by his 
own name or as the defendant. The foregoing is con-
sistent with the appellant's identification of the parties. 
"T-----·" refers to a page reference in the transcript 
of the trial proceedings. "lL ____ ,, refers to a page refer-
ence in the record. of the case. 
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RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
'l'he defendant's statement of facts up to the point of 
the trial (p. 2 and 3 of appellant's brief) is substantially 
correct. Thereafter, the appellant launches into matters 
which are more appropriately a part of his argument. 
Respondent will therefore make no other statement at 
this point in her brief but will in the course of the argu-
ment point out other additional pertinent facts which 
amply support the findings and decree of the trial court. 
SCOPE OF REVIEW 
"There are numerous decisions of this court 
holding that the Supreme Court will not substi-
tute its judgment in a divorce proceeding relative 
to alimony and division of property for that of 
the trial court unless the record clearly discloses 
that the trial court's decree in such matters is 
plainly arbitrary." Allen v. Allen, 109 Utah 99 
(1946), 165 P.2d 872. 
See also Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 
P.2d 252, 254, Stewart v. Stewart 66 Utah 366, 242 P. 
947; Adamson v. Adamson, 55 Utah 544, 188 P. 635; 
Pinney v. Pinney, 66 Utah 612, 245 P. 329; Bullen v. 
Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 P. 292; Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah 
306, 121 P. 19, Ann. Cas. 1914D 989, 38 L.R.A., N.S. 269; 
Friedli v. Friedli, 65 Utah 605, 238 P. 647; Pinion v. 




THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT IN REFER-
ENCE TO THE PLAINTIFF'S GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE 
ARE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND PLAIN-
TIFF WAS ENTITLED TO THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AS 
GRANTED. 
The findings of the trial court in reference to the 
plaintiff's grounds for divorce are amply supported by 
the evidence. The following excerpts from her testimony 
clearly indicate the rPspondent's grounds for divorce: 
('T. 7, 8) 
"A I prefer not to give the sordid details. 
However, I found shortly after my marriage that 
I was no longer the object of Mr. Barrett's love 
and affection. In fact, I was primarily a mistress 
in marriage. He totally rejected me in most cases 
and particularly after the - we found out we 
were expecting our little girl. 
"Q How soon after your marriage to Mr. 
Barrett was it before you found out that you were 
expecting the birth of a child~ 
"A I'm not entirely sure. I visited doctors 
in Las Vegas, and they determined that I was 
with child. I suppose the record would be there 
if you would care to secure that record. 
"Q lt was iuum·diately affrr your rnaniage. 
Is that correct? 
"A Yes. A very short time after we moved 
to Las Vegas. 
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"Q Now, could you indicate just generally 
what you observed about his attitude changing? 
You alluded to that previously. Indicate to the 
court what you observed in that respect, his at-
titude toward you. 
"A Well, he just became inconsiderate, tyran-
nical, and dictatorial in his behavior. 
"Q Were you subject to any physical abuse 7 
"A Yes, on occasion"*** 
"Q Give the court some indication of what 
threats you were exposed to. 
"A The night before I left, Bob had been 
drinking part of the day, and he had been dis-
appointed in a legal problem; and although I un-
derstand that he had been drinking and was disap-
pointed and had his share of problems in his po-
sition -
"Q And what happened 7 
"A l\lacoy, I would like not to talk about it, 
please. 
"Q I'm not asking, Mrs. Barrett, that you go 
into what you indicate sordid details. 
"A I submitted you a piece of paper. May 
I have your permission to read it in court1 ... 
(T. 7, 8) 
It is apparent that she was imposed upon and abused 
in their intimate personal life (T. 9). In addition, (T. 
9, 10) 
" ... He threatened me that he was going to beat 
my g. d. head off and in fact attempted to do so 
on the day I left him. 
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"Q What did he do on that day? 
"A He came at me like - told me he was 
going to beat my g. d. head off and came toward 
me. I '.Vent out through the door, and ht' slammed 
the door and I screamPd. I didn't frel that I could 
take a possible chance of the destruction of our 
unborn baby regardless of anything. 
"Q Now, you stated as l believe a little earlier 
that you observed after your marriage and after 
it was discovered that you were pregnant that he 
was I think you used the words dictatorial, maybe 
domineering. vVould you indicate briefly what 
you were objecting to in that respect? 
"A Just vulgar language and untrue accusa-
tions and suspicions."*** 
"Q Did he ever strike you 1 
"A No. He attempted to. He did grab me by 
the arm on one occasion and throw me into the 
bed, but apart from that, he didn't ever strike me, 
no, but I know he would have on that particular 
day." (T. 9, 10) 
It was only when counsel for the plaintiff in the 
trial of the case unduly pressed for further sordid details 
in regard to the prolilems in the marriage that the plain-
tiff understandably expn·ssed some rdnctance in re-
sponding (T. 10, 11) which caused some annoyance to the 
court (T. 11). Plaintiff did make tlw statement that she 
did not want a di Yon·(~ ( '!'. 11) and c:vPn sai<l that she 
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loved the defendant (T. 11) which prompted the court 
to say, "\Vhy don't we go home." (T. 12) Plaintiff was 
so distraught, upset and beside herself that the court 
granted a short recess (T. 12) and thereafter in a dis-
cussion between plaintiff, her counsel and the court she 
was able to convey to the court that in stating that she 
dirl not want a divorce she was really stating that she 
regretted that her marriage was ending as it was; that 
this was not really what she "wanted" but that she cer-
tainly did want the court to grant the decree she was 
seeking. ( T. 13-15) rrhat the plaintiff certainly did want 
a decree of divorce was then clarified for the record 
(T. 15-16) and the plaintiff then proceeded to state ad-
ditional problems and difficulties that had occurred in 
their marriage (T. 17-21). 
It was only after listening to such an elaboration of 
of sordid details and seeing the plaintiff so emotionally 
upset and beside herself that the court in an obvious 
effort to terminate an unnecessary elaboration of such 
details, s1Jare her feelings and get on with other import-
ant matters in the trial of the case that the court stated 
''It may be that counsel will stipulate that grounds for 
divorce have now been shown." (T. 21) Pursuant to that 
suggestion Mr. Beless who conducted the trial of the case 
and had seen all that had unfolded had no hesitation in 
stating, "Yes, I will so stipulate." (T. 21) 
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In the lig·ht of the record and the emotion filled trial 
of the case which could uot possi\Jly be reflected in full 
measure on the record thPre is no question that the 
plaintiff has shown ample grounds for the divorce she 
is seeking. 'l'lte suggesti011 Uiat she has not sho\\'n sud1 
grounds should only be interpreted as a prelude to the 
defendant's argurnent that tlH' mn1rd of alimony to the 
plaintiff should be diminished. rrhe defendant's real 
argument has always bce11 '"dollars'' and not ''grounds." 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ACCEPTING 
THE STIPULATION OF COUNSEL THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
HAD BY HER TESTIMONY SHOWN GROUNDS FOR DI-
VORCE. 
The argument under Point I clearly demonstrates 
the suggestion of the trial court that "lt may be 
that counsel would stipulate that grounds for divorce 
have now been shown," was most appropriate; was an 
obvious effort to shorten the trial and not to prolong the 
record when in the colut's mind grounds had already 
been shown. Certainly the def end ant having stipulated 
that grounds for divorce had then been shown is not now 
on this appeal in any position to raise the <1uestion. If 
nothing else he is estoppE3d. 
8 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING 
THE PLAINTIFF ALIMONY IN THE SUM OF $25'0 PER 
MONTH UNTIL HER DEA:TH OR REMARRIAGE. 
1'he award of alimony to the plaintiff in the sum of 
$250 per month until her death or remarriage was amply 
justified by the evidence. 
Matters to be considered in awarding alimony and 
settling property rights are well established. Allen v. 
Allen, 109 Utah 99, 165 P.2d 872; Anderson v. Anderson, 
104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252; Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 
67 P.2d 265. 
At the time of the plaintiff's marriage to the defen-
dant she owned a one-third interest in property in Salt 
Lake City having an equity value of /approximately 
$7,000 (T. 22). She had had previous employment where-
by she earned $400 per month and $50 a month traveling 
expense (T. 23). She had also worked as a secretary 
earning $350 per month (T. 23). During the year prior 
to her marriage to Mr. Barrett she had worked at the 
Alpine Rose Lodge earning $±00 per month (T. 23). 
It is true that she had children by a former marriage 
and was receiving $50 per month for the support of each 
of those children (T. 23). 
On the other hand, the plaintiff's testimony that at 
the time of the marriage of the parties the defendant 
was a multi-millionaire was undisputed (T. 23). He was 
the owner of the Solitude Ski Resort (T. 24). Since the 
marriage of the parties, Michele, their daughter, was 
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born, and that terminated ht:·r ability to work and hPr 
opportunity for employ111ent ( T. :2·1-:23). On the other 
hand, the defendant has lwt>n most successful and made 
the undisputed statement to the plaintiff that "1\laking 
a million dollars is tlw c•asiest thing in the world .... " 
(T. 25) 
At the time of the trial tht> only income the plaintiff 
had was the temporary support allowance re<111ired to be 
paid by the defendant and the support that came to her 
for the benefit of her children by the prior marriage ( T. 
25). As for the defendant, the plaintiff's statement that 
he, the defendant, had put two and one-half million dol-
lars into his ski lifts and that if he advertised in the New 
York Times he believed that he could i_·asily sell it for 
-1 million dollars is undisputed. (T. 27) 
As for the plaintiff's living conditions at the time of 
the trial the same were very inadcq uate ( T. 27). She 
gave a room by room description of where she was 
living (T. 27) all of which indicated juRtification of her 
statement that her place was "Just inadequate in every 
respect. Socially is a devastating situation." ('r. 28) 
Her furnishings were likewise inadc•quak ( T. :28) and 
much was borrowed ( 'l1. 2~). 
\Vith respect to her current living 1wt•d:,; she stated 
that what she n~ally needed was a home ('l'. ~ll). For 
her i111111ediatt'. quartc·rs it \\·as stated tliat it would lH' nl'e-
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essary to rent an apartment for which she would be 
re(1uired to pay $200 per month. She stated that the de-
fendant ought to pay $150 of this amount (T. 30). As 
for the home which she really needs the plaintiff stated 
that with the present equity she has in her property she 
could with an additional $17,000 obtain one (T. 31). Food 
and household items require $150 per month (T. 31). 
Medical needs amount to $25 per month (T. 32). With 
respect to clothing, she needs $50 per month (T. 32). As 
for transportation for her and Michele she needs $40 per 
month (T. 32). This, of course, includes insurance (T. 
32). $50 per month is necessary for her to pay for such 
furniture as she needed. With respect to miscellaneous 
items such as education and recreational activities, etc. 
it is her best judgment that she will require from $50 
to $100 per month (T. 32-33). If she were awarded a suf-
ficient amount to obtain a home she would need for main-
tenance and utilities about $100 per month (T. 33). 
The foregoing living requirements for the plaintiff 
and Michele, all of which were undisputed, total $615. 
'l'he plaintiff was seeking to have the court award 
her the sum of $200 per month for the child of the parties 
the same to be fortified by a trust arrangement similar 
to that provided for the defendant's earlier child, Tina 
(R. 68). She was seeking $500 per month as alimony 
(R. 69) and further sought to have the court award her 
the diamond ring in addition the sum of $17,500. (A 
suffieit>nt sum to purchase a modest home.) (R. 69). 
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The trust providing $200 iwr rnontl1 for Tina tlH• 
child of his second marriag·e is still operating ( T. 52, 54). 
File No. 105959 was marked and received as Exhibit D3. 
The file was received only for the purpose of the trust 
agreement (T. 54). 
The trial court did not secure the payment of the 
$200 per month support money by the establishment of 
a trust as was requested but instead made an award of 
support and alimony and cash in tlw amount of $15,000. 
The court was no doubt conCl'rIH:'d with tlw indifferent 
attitude that has been <•xhibifrd hy the deft>ndant ever 
since the pregnancy of the plaintiff and suhst>qu<>nt birth 
of Michele (T. 7, 8). The plaintiff did not even know 
where the defendant was when the ehild was born ( T. -1-G). 
He never even came to see the plaintiff immediatdy he-
fore of after the birth of the child and has never COlll<' to 
see the plaintiff since she has been separah•d and has 
never been to see Michele (T. ±(i). He has never sent 
Michele anything other than money, which lw has bePn 
required to pay by reason of the ordl'l' of the court ( '11 • 
~7). He has never so much as even seen l\lichele ( T. 47), 
nor has he made any inquiries to the plaintiff as to how 
she is getting along (T. 47). 
It is evident, therefore, that the record supports the 
alimony award of $250 which was suhstantially less than 
the plaintiff \Vas seeking. As a matter of fact, the urnlis-
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puted testimony would have supported a combined award 
of at least $615 per month for alimony and support. 
There was certainly nothing arbitrary in what the court 
granted unless it was to grant a combined alimony and 
support money award of only $450 when the undisputed 
evidence was that she needed at least $615. 
There is, of course, no dispute in regard to the $200 
per month to be paid as support for the child Michele. 
The trial court's concluding remarks aptly sum up 
the situation. The trust agreement for the former child, 
Tina, contemplated $200 per month which was the stand-
ard he had set for that child. The trial court thought 
he ought to do as well for the child of this marriage (T. 
71). The court was impressed that the plaintiff's status 
had substantially changed, that whereas prior to the 
marriage she was employed and able to earn a substantial 
salary, now, she "is still a baby sitter. There is no way 
for her to get out of that and she is entitled to some-
thing in that regard. I think she ought to be entitled to 
$250 a month as alimony until she remarries or until her 
death, and I think the man ought to have that ring. 
I think that ring is all beyond the lady's means and 
capacity, and if she goes around showing that, somebody 
will be taking it away from her and leaving her with a tap 
on the head to remind her that she owned a diamond 
ring." (T. 72) 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING TO 
THE PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $15,000 BY WAY OF A 
DIVISION OF PROPERTY. 
As for the cash award of $15,000 this is a pittance 
insofar as the defendant is concerned. Exhibit "1", the 
balance sheet of Barrl'tt Investment Company, gives 
some indication of the net worth of the defendant. The 
defendant of course, is the sole stockholder of Barrett 
Investment Company (T. 56). Exhibit "l", the balance 
sheet, shows among the liabilities of Barrett Investment 
Company an amount of $1,444,178.28 payable to the de-
fendant himself. Exhibit P-'5, the R. M. Barrett Agency 
account gives some further indication of the defendant's 
substantial wealth. Likewise, Exhibit P-4, defendant's 
answers to plaintiff's interrogatories, gives further en-
lightenment as to the means and resources of the def en-
dant. 
Now the ring, which was acquired for the plaintiff, 
(T. 33-34) was thought by the court for the reasons 
noted above to be best awarded to the defendant. The 
ring had a value of approximately $9,500 (R. 48). 
The court's first imvression insofar as a cash award 
was concerned was to give the plaintiff $10,000 (T. 72) 
which would have essentially h<~Pn cash in liPu of the ring 
which the trial court though would be much to hPr ad-
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vantage. It was in the "further argument" noted on 
page 73 of the transcript that it was pointed out to the 
court that considering the wealth of the defendant as 
evidenced by Exhibit 1 and P-5, that the defendant him-
self personally had a claim of $1,444,198.28 against Bar-
rett Inverstment Company and that Barrett Investment 
Company was still able to show a net worth in excess of 
one million dollars; that is was therefore not inappropri-
ate in view of the plaintiff's needs and circumstances that 
the plaintiff should be awarded her ring and a greater 
sum than $10,000. The trial court then agreed that the 
plaintiff should be awarded $15,000 but still felt the 
defendant should be awarded the ring. 
Counsel for the defendant who was not present at 
the trial has misconstrued the intent and purpose of the 
court's words "I think I ought to give her $15,000. That 
would pay her well." (T. 73) This statement was not 
made with any vindictiveness nor with any thought of 
penalizing the defendant but was simply the court's ob-
servation that the award that was being made was suf-
ficient. 
POINT V 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL 
AWARD AS A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR 
LEGAL SERVICES RENDERED IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE APPEAL OF THE CASE IN THE AMOUNT OF $.ff/! ... 
The defendant is not contesting the award of $1,750 
to thl' plaintiff as a reasonable attorney's fee. The stip-
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ulation of the parties at the trial with respect to the font> 
spent in handling the case and the reasonable charge for 
time spent precludes any such argument on that point. 
Now, of course, the plaintiff has lwen required to 
have the assistance of counsel in representing her on the 
appeal. The plaintiff is here\vith filing a petition in con-
nection with the appeal supported by an affidavit indicat-
ing the appropriateness of the award she is seeking. 
Based on her petition and supporting affidavit and the 
stipulation of the parties at the trial of the case that $20 
would be a reasonable charge ver hour ('11 • G8), the plain-
tiff should be awarded by this court an additional at-
torney's fee in the amount of $ __ 9.5?t? ___ . 
SUMMARY 
In summary, the plaintiff contends that the record 
clearly reveals ample grounds for divorce; that the 
award of $250 per month as alimony is justified by the 
evidence. The defendant is not contesting the award of 
$200 per month as support money for the child, Michele. 
As for the award of $15,000 as has been pointed out the 
plaintiff was not awarded her diamond ring worth ap-
proximately $9,500 but instead was given a cash award 
in the amount indicated which in view of the relative cir-
cumstances of the parties \Vas modest to say the least. 
The plaintiff is not able to pursue her employment but 
is no-w a "hahy sitter." She is only seeking to assume 
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her role as a mother and give the proper care and atten-
tion to a child of Mr. Barrett whose unwillingness to pay 
the amount awarded by the trial court without direction 
from this court is certainly not justified in view of his 
wealth. It is difficult to imagine that he would, under 
the circumstances, be willing for the plaintiff to have 
the amount awarded by the trial court which would per-
mit the plaintiff to acquire a much needed home for 
her and Michele, and yet it must be conceded that this 
attitude is quite consistent with the attitude he has 
demonstrated in the past, an attitude of a total lack of 
concern for the well-being of either the plaintiff or the 
child of the parties (T. 46-47). The judgment and decree 
of the trial court should be affirmed and the plaintiff 
should be awarded the additional sum of $ .. ff.~-- as a 
reasonable fee for legal services rendered in connection 
with the appeal of the case. 
McKAY AND BURTON 
and 
MACOY A. McMURRAY 
By (:({rt:f f~UI!<~ _'J,_YE:'~ / 
Macoy A. Mc~;-~~y ' . . 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Resporulent 
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